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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The southern boundary of Indiana is the low-water mark on the
northern bank of the Ohio River and the river itself is within the boun-
daries of Kentucky.1 However Indiana can and does exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the river.16 The United States Supreme Court has
upheld Indiana's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over the river,17
and so have the courts of Kentucky.'8 This concurrent jurisdiction
over the Ohio River has been defined by Kentucky to mean that
Indiana is entitled to as much power; "legislative, judiciary, and
executive, as that possessed by Kentucky, over so much of the Ohio
River as flows between them."' 9 The Indiana courts have upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction on the Ohio River in both civil and criminal
cases.20 This concurrent jurisdiction over the river has been held to
mean, "that laws enacted by the General Assembly extend to and are
in force in the territory over which the jurisdiction of the State is
concurrent, without any special or particular provision on the sub-
ject.... "21 For these reasons Indiana has the power to enforce its
pollution laws on persons who dump sewage directly into the Ohio
River and who are subject to its jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RIGHT OF INDIGENT PRISONER TO COUNSEL
Petitioner, indigent and of meager education, was indicted for rob-
bery and requested that counsel be appointed for him. His request
was denied on the ground that it was contrary to local practice except
15. Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374 (U.S. 1820); Indiana
v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890); Carlisle et al. v. State, 32 Ind.
55 (1869); Sherlock et al. v. Alling Adm., 44 Ind. 184 (1873)
aff'd 93 U.S. 99 (1876); McFall v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 394(1859); Perks et al. v. McCracken, 169 Ky. 590, 184 S.W. 891(1916); Nicoulin v. O'Brien, 172 Ky. 473, 189 S.W. 724 (1916).
But see Watts v. Evansville, Mte. and 'N. Ry. Co. et al. 191 Ind.
27, 129 N.E. 315 (1919).
16. Virginia Revised Code (1819) 59. By this act Virginia ceded her
land which became the state of Kentucky and said that the juris-
diction on "The river [Ohio] shall be concurrent . . . with the
states which may possess the opposite shores of the said river."
Accord: Ind. Const. Art. 14, § 2, "Indiana shall have . . . con-
current jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases with the state of
Kentucky on the Ohio River .... "
17. Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 (1904); also, Sherlock et al. v.
Alling Adm., 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
18. Nicoulin v. O'Brien, 172 Ky. 473, 189 S.W. 724 (1916); McFall
v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 394 (1859); Church et al. v. Chambers,
33 Ky. 274 (1835).
19. Arnold and Parrish v. Shields et al., 35 Ky. 18, 22 (1837).
20. Carlisle et al. v. State, 32 Ind. 55 (1869) (conviction of murder
committed upon the Ohio River); Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25
N.E. 883 (1890) (conviction for violation of Indiana liquor laws
upon the river); Dugan v. State, 125 Ind. 130, 25 N.E. 171 (1890)(conviction for violation of Sunday laws on the Ohio River); Mem-
phis and Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Pikey Adm., 142 Ind. 304, 40
N.E. 527 (1895) (prosecution of a tort committed upon the river).
21 Sherlock et al. v. Alling Adm., 44 Ind. 184 (1873), aff'd, 93 U.S.
99 (1876).
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in eases of rape and murder. Without waiving his asserted right to
counsel he pleaded not guilty, elected to be tried without a jury, and
conducted his own defense. Following conviction, his petition to a
state judge for writ of habeas corpus was rejected, and he applied
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Held, affirmed.
Where the issue is simple, the accused of ordinary intelligence, the
crime less than a capital offense, and the appointment of counsel not
required by state law, the guaranty of the Sixth Amendment of counsel
in criminal cases is not included in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1
The right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions was fully rec-
ognized in the original thirteen colonies, and the rule of the English
common law2 was definitely rejected. 3 It is reasonable, therefore, to
assume that the Sixth Amendment 4 to the Federal Constitution was
adopted primarily to reject the English rule which denied the right
to full defense to a person charged with a serious erime.5 Consistently
with this view, the right has not only been extended to defendants
in federal criminal cases, but it has been held that the federal courts
owe a duty8 to appoint counsel for indigent defendants, and are only
discharged from this duty when there is a competent and intelligent
waiver.7 While it is universally agreed that the first eight amend-
ments are limitations only on the powers of the Federal Government,
it has been held that the right to counsel is guarded against invasion by
state action through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 The rationale of this view is that any rights enumerated in the first
1. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) Justices Black, Murphy, and
Douglas dissenting.
2. It was only after the revolution of 1688 that a full defense was
allowed in England on trials for treason; and it was not until
1836 that the right to counsel was extended to felonies other than
treason. 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1924) 192;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 696-701. See
also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932); Gall v. Brady,
39 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Md. 1941).
3. See Powell v, Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932); Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 386 (1898).
4. U.S. Const. Amend. VI, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense."
5. Comment (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev. 271. See Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 60 (1932); Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 656 (1860).
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Glasser v. U.S., 315
U.S. 60, 71 (1941); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854); 14 Am.
Jur., Crim. Law 174.
7. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938); Shores v. United States, 297 U.S. 705 (1936).
8. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 808
U.S. 444 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Boyd v.
O'Grady, 121 F. (2d) 146 (1941); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d)
586, 1 F. Supp. 1001 (1932). U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 pro-
vides: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."
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eight amendments that are in the nature of "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions" are essential requisites to due process of law.9 It has
been further held that the right to the assistance of counsel is not
satisfied by a formal appointment of counsel to defend an. indigent
prisoner,o but that the right includes an opportunity for consultation,ll
reasonable time for preparation of the defense,12 and the appointment
of competent counsel.1S
Due process of law within the meaning of the Federal Constitu-
tion does not import one thing with reference to the powers of the
states, and another with reference to the powers of the general Gov-
ernment.14 The much cited case of Hurtado v. Califoi'5 stands
opposed to this proposition, but the decision rests on technical con-
struction,76 and other compelling considerations, when present, indicate
that it not be followed.17 Furthermore, upon the state courts, equally
with the federal courts, rests the duty to guard and enforce every
right secured by the national Constitution.18 It is worthy of notice
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 75, (1941) the court said, "The right of the accused to have
the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations concerning the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial."
See also Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 562; 1 Cooley, Con-
stitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 700; 2 Story on the Constitution,(4th ed.) 668; 11 Am. Jur., Const. Law 310-311.
10. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941).
11. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); State v. Davis, 9 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 94, 130 Pac. 962 (1913).
12. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 71 (1932); Downer v. Dun-
away, 53 F. (2d) 586, 1 F. Supp. 1001'(1932); Commonwealth v.
O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 173, 148 Atl. 73 (1929).
13. People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911); State v. Hilge-
mann, - Ind.- , 34 N.E. (2d) 129 (1941). In People v.
Blevins, supra it was held that where private counsel had been
employed to assist the prosecution, it would be oppressive to the
indigent defendant if the court allowed more attorneys to prose-
cute than he appointed to defend.
14. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935); Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904). Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 541 (1884) (dissenting opinion).
15. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
16. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884). In holding
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
necessarily require an indictment by grand jury in a state prose-
cution for murder, the court said that inasmuch as the require-
ment was specifically stated in the Fifth Amendment it was not
included in the due process clause since it cannot be presumed
that any part of the Constitution is superfluous.
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1941).
18. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69 (1941); Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 637 (1884).
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that the courts, in determining that due process has been accorded,
stress the fact that the defendant had the assistance of counsel.29
Most of the states have regarded the right to counsel to one
charged with serious crime as essential to justice, and have indicated
their position by constitutional provision, statute, or established prac-
tice judicially approved.20
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE INDUCED BY MEANS OF
INTERCEPTED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS
Upon trial under federal indictments for mail fraud and con-
spiracy, petitioners were convicted largely by the testimony of two
witnesses who had been induced to turn state's evidence by being con-
fronted with phonographic recordings of telephone messages intercepted
by federal investigators, to which messages the petitioners had not
been parties. Petitioners made objection to the testimony of the wit-
nesses where such testimony was induced or refreshed by the use
of such intercepted messages on grounds that such messages were
illegally obtained in violation of the Federal Communication Act. 48
STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1941). Held, testimony induced
by illegally intercepted telephone communications admissible against
one not a party to the communication. Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114 (1942).
The common law rule, that- the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which the party
has been enabled to obtain the evidence, prevailed in the federal
courts until repudiated on the grounds that the illegal seizure,
being a violation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment
was inadmissible in evidence. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
634 (1885). This prohibition against admissibility was in effect re-
moved later. Cf. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 586 (1904).
Whatever question this latter decision may have left concerning the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, it was later held that
documents obtained through search made by a federal officer without
warrant were inadmissible as evidence if prior to trial a motion
was made for the return of such documents. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 396, 398 (1914). The tendency of the federal courts to
19. See Kelley v. Oregon, 273 U.S. 589, 591 (1927); Frank v. Man-
gum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123,
129 (1906).
20. See inst. case (appendix to dissenting opinion, p. 477). In only
two states has the requirement of counsel for indigent defendants
in non-capital cases been affirmatively rejected (Maryland and
Texas). But see Coates v. State, - Md.-; 25 A. (2d) 676
(1942) where the Court of Appeals granted an appeal on an in-
formal letter from the defendant, delivered after the expiration
of the period during which appeals must be filed, and reversed
the judgment. A colored boy of nineteen had been convicted with-
out the aid of counsel on nine charges including robbery, assault,
and burglary. In reversing the judgment the court held that
counsel should have been appointed as, an essential of due-process
of law.
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restrict the operation of the rule that evidence illegally obtained is
inadmissible, is apparent. Evidence secured through illegal search
and seizure has been held admissible where no application for re-
turn was made prior to trial. Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed.
795, 797 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920), McMann v. Engel, 16 F. Supp. 446, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), 87 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937); where the search and seizure is made by a third
party not acting in collusion with federal officers, Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921); where illegal search and seizure is
made by a state officer, United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75, 81
(W.D.Mo. 1922); where illegal search and seizure was made on prem-
ises not owned or occupied by defendant, MacDaniel v. United States,
294 Fed. 769, 771 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924). Search and seizure with con-
sent of party-defendant is not within the rule, Dillon v. United States,
279 Fed. 639 (C.C.A. 2d, 1921); where defendant is not the party
against whom the illegal search and seizure was made, Connolly V.
Medalie, 28 F. (2d) 629, 630 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
Evidence obtained by the modern method of wire tapping was
first held to be admissible as not being a search and seizure in viola-
tion of the FOURTH AMEINDMENT. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 464, (1928). The act of wire tapping was made illegal by 48
STAT. 1103 (1934) 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1941), and evidence thus obtained
was declared to be inadmissible. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 381 (1937). Any evidence derived from or made accessible by
the act of wire tapping was held to be inadmissible. Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Evidence from wire tap-
ping was held inadmissible although consent to the interception was
given by one party to the communication, United States v. Polakoff,
112 F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940),
Note (1941) 16 Ind. L.J. 412.
In the instant case, there are indications that the courts are to
construe illegal wire tapping just as any other illegal search and
seizure in violation of a party's constitutional rights, subject to all
the exceptions and limitations which have attached to the law as set
forth in Weeks v. United States, supra, until such time as it is rec-
ognized that public policy is not served by permitting the fact of an
illegal search and seizure to prevent the introduction at the trial of
indispensable evidence in the state's case. The path of effective law
enforcement is one to be facilitated rather than obstructed.
LEGISLATION
SPECIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION LAWS
The legislature enacted a statute which postponed elections of
officials for all cities and school cities in the state except those
of the first class. The statute was attacked as a violation of con-
stitutional provisions forbidding special legislation. Held, the act was
special in violation of the constitution. Ettinger et al. v. Studevent,
Hole et al. v. Dice, -Ind.-, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000 (1942).
The Indiana Legislature is forbidden to enact special laws on
17 enumerated subjects, and special legislation cannot be enacted in
19431
